Найти книгу: "Modern Imperialism, Monopoly Finance Capital, and Marx's Law of Value"

Unlike such obvious forms of oppression as feudalism or slavery, capitalism has been able to survive through its genius for disguising corporate profit imperatives as opportunities for individual human equality and advancement. But it was the genius of Karl Marx, in his masterwork, Capital, to discover the converse law of surplus value: behind the illusion of the democratic, supply-and-demand marketplace, lies the workplace, where people trying to earn a living are required to work way beyond the time it takes to pay their wages. Leave it to the genius of Samir Amin to advance Marx's theories—adding to them the work of radical economists such as Michal Kalecki, Josef Steindl, Paul Baran, and Paul Sweezy—to show how Marxian theory can be adapted to modern economic conditions. Amin extends Marx's analysis to describe a concept of “imperialist rent” derived from the radically unequal wages paid for the same labor done by people in both the Global North and the Global South, the rich nations and the poor ones. This is global oligopolistic capitalism, in which finance capital has come to dominate worldwide production and distribution. Amin also advances Baran and Sweezy’s notion of economic surplus to explain a globally monopolized system in which Marx's “law of value” takes the form of a “law of globalized value,” generating a super-exploitation of workers in the Global South. Modern Imperialism, Monopoly Finance Capital, and Marx's Law of Value offers readers, in one volume, the complete collection of Samir Amin’s work on Marxian value theory. The book includes texts from two of Amin's recent works, Three Essays on Marx’s Value Theory and The Law of Worldwide Value, which have provoked considerable controversy and correspondence. Here, Amin answers his critics with a series of letters, clarifying and developing his ideas. This work will occupy an important place among the theoretical resources for anyone involved in the study of contemporary Marxian economic and political theory.Unlike such obvious forms of oppression as feudalism or slavery, capitalism has been able to survive through its genius for disguising corporate profit imperatives as opportunities for individual human equality and advancement. But it was the genius of Karl Marx, in his masterwork, Capital, to discover the converse law of surplus value: behind the illusion of the democratic, supply-and-demand marketplace, lies the workplace, where people trying to earn a living are required to work way beyond the time it takes to pay their wages. Leave it to the genius of Samir Amin to advance Marx's theories—adding to them the work of radical economists such as Michal Kalecki, Josef Steindl, Paul Baran, and Paul Sweezy—to show how Marxian theory can be adapted to modern economic conditions. Amin extends Marx's analysis to describe a concept of “imperialist rent” derived from the radically unequal wages paid for the same labor done by people in both the Global North and the Global South, the rich nations and the poor ones. This is global oligopolistic capitalism, in which finance capital has come to dominate worldwide production and distribution. Amin also advances Baran and Sweezy’s notion of economic surplus to explain a globally monopolized system in which Marx's “law of value” takes the form of a “law of globalized value,” generating a super-exploitation of workers in the Global South. Modern Imperialism, Monopoly Finance Capital, and Marx's Law of Value offers readers, in one volume, the complete collection of Samir Amin’s work on Marxian value theory. The book includes texts from two of Amin's recent works, Three Essays on Marx’s Value Theory and The Law of Worldwide Value, which have provoked considerable controversy and correspondence. Here, Amin answers his critics with a series of letters, clarifying and developing his ideas. This work will occupy an important place among the theoretical resources for anyone involved in the study of contemporary Marxian economic and political theory.

In order to develop production and expand markets for all interested in handling financial resources. Own funds are limited because actual borrowed funds of credit institutions. Loan is secured by collateral, for which execution is levied for improper fulfillment of financial obligations. When activated, deposit procedures arises business process by which the performance of collateral, encumbered with outstanding financial obligation, it becomes a catalyst for dispersion of its value among the involved credit institutions affiliated to it the same structures, and the borrower, the owner of the collateral, forced to pay for their services. Registry of collateral individual credit institution is the value of having a monetary value, or more precisely register the debt, the return of the collateral is provided, during the implementation procedures of the collateral is an extremely topical issue of cost. Affiliated bank structure use a "ready" for implementation of the collateral as a financial instrument whose value is dynamic in time.

The aim of the article is to perform an economic and legal analysis of the financial claims of the credit institution to the borrower through the implementation of the acquired using borrowed funds vehicle that is owned by the borrower and burdened the right of pledge in favor of the bank. And also to identify factors influencing the effect of the financial cost of spraying alienated collateral, including affiliated bank structures, be associated with this process.

Although new ventures’ competitive positioning and their founders’ social networks are both recognized as important in the context of transition economies, not much is known about their multiplicative effect on performance. We build on the strategic management literature and social network theory to develop theoretical predictions about the role of competitive strategies and social capital for entrepreneurial performance. These are tested with survey data from Bulgaria. We find that both the venture’s competitive strategic positioning and the founder’s networking positively influence performance. The hypothesized moderating effect of networking for the relationship between differentiation strategy and performance received only tentative support. Contrary to expectations, we find a negative moderating effect of networking for the relationship of cost leadership with performance. These results suggest that the entrepreneur’s network plays a role in shaping how strategies influence performance by possibly upholding differentiation and deemphasizing cost leadership strategy. Implications for managerial practice and public policy are discussed.